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From Paradigm to Paradim Shift: 
The Military and Operations Other 
Than War 
Clemson G. Turregano & Ricky Lynn Waddell 
United States Military Academy 
The purpose of military forces is combat, that is to deter 
and to defeat the enemus of the United States; that is 
their central mission, their raison d'etre, the only 
justification for expending resources on their creation and 
maintenance. 
Samuel Huntington 1 
Beware of Foreign Entanglements 
George Washington 
These might well be the watchwords of the anned forces officer 
when presented with missions referred to in Department of Defense 
(DoD) parlance as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). OOTW 
includes, but is not limited to: "nation assistance, security and advisory 
assistance, counterdrug operations, anns control, treaty verification, 
support to domestic civil authorities, and peacekeeping. "2 More often 
than not, OOTW involves intervention in another nation's political 
situation. 
American military officers, in general, have an ambivalent, if not 
The authors would like to thank the Department of Social Sciences at the 
United States Military Academy, especially Colonels Jim Golden, Dan 
Kaufman, Fred Black, and Joe Collins for their support and guidance. We 
also thank the Army Research Institute for their financial support 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not purport to 
reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department 
of the Army, or the Department of Defense. 
1 Samuel Huntington, "Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military, " 
Non-CombaJ Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post Cold War Era, James 
Graham, ed (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press 1993) 5. 
2FM100-5, Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army 1993) 2-
0. 
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negative attitude towards OOTW. This outlook results from a variety 
of organizational and operational reasons. This article examines why 
American armed forces are hesitant to accept OOTW missions. First, 
the article clarifies areas of concern by concentrating on organizational 
attitudes from an officer's perspective. Second, the discussion addresses 
how the doctrine is changing to meet current international realities 
regarding OOTW, while simultaneously addressing organizational 
concerns. 
Officers do not feel OOTW is useless or irrelevant. OOTW is a 
necessity in a world that may produce conflicts over scarce resources, 
rising ethnicity, religion, or resurgent nationalism.3 Wars generated by 
these hatreds have no borders, no respect for basic humanity, and are 
exceptionally ruthless. In addition , these conflicts are usually internal 
and regional. They do not pose overt external threats. The regionality, 
ethnicity. and lack of borders involved in these wars pose significant 
challenges for planners, which in tum heightens the concern by 
American officers towards involvement. 
DoD will always accept the missions passed down by the National 
Command Authority, but the military leaders who advise elected leaders 
will voice their concerns towards OOTW based on three 
behavioral/historical themes: the desire for concrete victory conditions, 
the desire to have a concrete definition of how firepower is to be used to 
achieve operational objectives, and the need for political and popular 
support. In short, their concerns revolve around victory, violence, and 
Vietnam.4 
The leaders' concerns about OOTW should not be taken as 
recalcitrance. Given the decision to execute OOTW, the Army has the 
ability to execute the mission due to years spent developing a doctrine 
enabling forces to execute OOTW with maximum effectiveness and 
minimum casualties . This doctrine, though lacking in certain respects , 
reflects an able attempt to address the officer's concerns towards OOTW. 
3For an excellent look inside the problems creating the conditions for 
low -intensity conflict, see John Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The 
Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, p. 44-60. Mr . Kaplan admirably applies 
and interprets other distinguished authors, such as Martin Van Creveld, 
John Keegan, Samuel Huntington, and Thomas Fraser Homer -Dixon, 
weaving them into a bleak, if not accurate, picture of the future. 
4The Clinton Administration shares these concerns. Anthony Lake, the 
President's National Security Advisor, recently stated in "The Limits to 
Peacekeeping, " New York Times, February 6, 1994, p. 17, that the 
administration will ask tough questions before becoming involved in any 
United Nations Peace Operation . These questions include, "What is the 
threat to our interests ? Is there a clearly defined mission? A distinct end 
point? How much will it cost? Are the resource s available? What is the 
likelihood of success?" 
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Cognitive barriers to OOTW 
Examining any organization is a difficult task.5 For our purposes, 
this article confines itself to the officer level. "The officer corps is the 
active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for 
the military security of society." 6 To fully understand the American 
disposition towards peacekeeping operations, and more specifically, 
OOTW, the reader needs to understand the issue from the perspective of 
the professional military officer. 
There are three conceptual foundations for the officer's concern 
towards OOTW; 
1) The American military is an organization centered and 
formed upon victory in battle. 
2) In general , officers view themselves as warriors, or, 
using a contemporary term, managers of violence . 
Most operations within OOTW do not fit within that 
definition. 
3) 'No More Vietnams.' The legitimacy of the armed 
forces, and especially the Army, lay with people.7 If 
a mission is not supported by the population, how do 
we justify involvement? 
Few people outside the military comprehend the responsibilities of 
officers in terms of the burden of leadership. According to FMI00-5, 
Leaders have special challenges and responsibilities in 
regard to soldiers. They successfully lead them 
through danger, mold and protect their spirit, and 
channel their energies toward mission 
accomplishment. Leaders consider the physiological, 
psychological, and ethical challenges soldiers will 
face , providing them the proper training and 
leadership that give them the will to fight. They 
build units and teams that have the courage to 
overcome odds to accomplish the mission and the 
determination to press on to victory . 8 
5James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (Basic Books 1989) 
6Samuel Huntington , The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Politics 
of Civil -Military Relations (New York: Vantage 1957) 3. 
7Ibid . 
8FM 100-5, 14-1. FM represents Field Manual. FMI00 -5 describes and 
defines the doctrinal foundation for Army Operations . 
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Because of this responsibility, the officer becomes very close to the 
soldiers under his or her command. This attachment relates not only to 
the fraternal bond generated through the hardship of the profession, but 
because any officer understands that soldiers are the key to victory. 
Without disciplined, well trained and motivated soldiers, the best 
equipment is worthless. Thus, risking a soldier's life is not done 
frivolously or without reason. 
Without a doubt, the best way to prepare soldiers is to train them 
for battle. A common adage is "More sweat on the drill field leads to 
less blood shed in battle." Before an officer trains soldiers, however, he 
or she must have a mission in order to orient the training. Mission-
oriented training is critical to effective forces. Proper training is the 
only way an officer can balance his duty to his soldiers, and his 
responsibility to accomplish the mission.9 
To insure proper training is one reason an officer must ask probing 
questions concerning any potential conflict. A clear definition of the 
mission enables them to train and mentally prepare soldiers for conflict. 
Officers want to know when they can declare victory. This clarification 
helps planners reduce casualties and operate wisely, aiding the troops' 
morale. Additionally, planners need to determine the amount of force to 
use. They need to know the legal status of the conflict, and the amount 
of support of the American people. 
There is no substitute for Victory (Douglas McArthur) 
A noted international relations scholar once mentioned that the 
reason the American Army does not get involved in peacekeeping 
operations is that as a superpower Army, the American Army has 
always been an Army of conquest -- it fights to win.1° For most of the 
wars of its history, the American Army, usually after some setbacks, 
emerges victorious and forces the adversary into unconditional surrender. 
Washington at Yorktown, Grant at Appomattox, Pershing at 
Compeigne, and McArthur in Tokyo Bay are historic symbols that 
represent the potential power and ultimate purpose of the American 
armed forces. 
This American bias is reinforced through doctrine which is based 
strongly upon Clausewitz' school of Total War. According to 
Clausewitz, in order to win, 
9For greater insighl concerning trammg units for OOTW, see Steve 
Vogel, 'Training for Macedonian Duties," Army Times, January 17, 1994, 
p.30 . 
10Discussion with Professor Lily Ling, Washington D.C .. 2 September 
1993. 
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... the art of war tells us: go for the greatest, most 
decisive purpose you can achieve; choose the surest 
way to it that you dare to go. War should be 
conducted with the utmost necessary or possible 
degree of effort.11 
War is fought for a political purpose, " ... either to destroy the 
enemy's state or dictate the terms of the peace." 12 You must, 
therefore, capture your enemy's heart...defeat his core, destroy his 
ability to wage war. 
Americans have followed this principle in past wars. Sherman 
demonstrated its potency in his 'March to the Sea' during the Civil War. 
The Army pursued Total War again in the West, with the wars against 
the Indians, annihilating total tribes and civilizations. In this century 
the doctrine of strategic bombing campaigns and night raids laid waste 
entire cities. 13 Strategic bombing, combined with armored thrusts 
towards the enemy's heartland contributed to victory. Properly used, the 
idea of depriving the enemy of its ability to fight can only leave one 
side in control of the battlefield. 
OOTW challenges the American officer's assumption of total war. 
Former Chief of Staff Carl Vuono addressed the issue very succinctly. 
At the end of Vuono's tenure, when it was clear that the Army would 
face a sizable reduction and a reorientation to new missions, an officer 
asked Vuono about the Army of the future and what bit of advice he 
would leave to his successor. Vuono replied, 
I'll tell you the purpose of the Army is to win the 
wars of the nation. That's what the purpose of the 
Army is. Don't let anybody give you nonsense about 
peripheral issues or peripheral missions. Well it 
would be nice if the Army did so and so. That may 
be good for a cup of coffee down the hall here, to talk 
about But don't spend more time than that on it. I 
sure as hell wouldn'L.14 
11
'Strategie' (1804) s.9 in Hahlweg (ed) Verstreute kleine Schriften, pp 
14 - 16, quoted from Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought : From the 
Enli~htenment to Clausewitz,(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989) 203. 
1 Ibid, 204. 
13These bombing raids, although invoking the spirit of Total War, were 
aimed at reducing the enemy's potential for manufacturing war goods. The 
British concept of night mass bombing was much more akin to total war 
than the American policy. 
14 Address to Pre-Command Course 91-9, 20 May 1991, Vuono Papers, 
Speeches and Remarks, 9 May 1991-11 June 1991. 
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As for the bit of advice, Vuono added, 
The first one is beware of the good idea guys .... You 
see, there's a lot of good idea fellows running 
around .... Who have a great program that they just 
think we got to institute in the Army. And watch the 
peripheral missions. Okay? They don't contribute to 
a trained and ready Army.15 
When Vuono spoke of fighting wars, he included short-term 
actions like the interventions in Grenada and Panama. 16 That the 
traditionalists still remained disdainful, however, of oLher low intensity 
missions in this period is clear. This is particularly true of politically 
ambiguous missions such as "nation-building," humanitarian 
intervention, peacekeeping, and even counterinsurgency. 17 
Being placed into a peacekeeping scenario is very difficult for an 
American officer. An officer is trained to use firepower and maneuver 
to defeat an enemy. This ability provides a beginning and ending point 
for a battle or war. If a mission does not have a prescribed beginning, 
means, and end, the officer is hesitant, for fear of being unable to 
develop the focus needed to bring effective fire on the enemy. This 
focus is critical for winning on the battlefield 
Many will say the American military desires free reign to 
accomplish anything they want on the battlefield. This is not entirely 
correct. More important than indiscriminate violence is the focus of the 
combat. What are the political objectives the government wants to 
achieve? For the military officer, Lhe government's responsibility is to 
establish the political boundaries within which the military can perform 
its mission. "Operational and tactical commanders need to know the 
non-military features of the conditions, and how to measure them in 
order to take them into consideration as they plan for, conduct, and 
evaluate the effectiveness of operations." 18 These boundaries provide 
the focus for overall, strategic victory. These boundaries must be clear 
15 Address to Pre-Command Course 91-9, 20 May 1991, Vuono Papers, 
Speeches and Remarks, 9 May 1991-11 June 1991. 
16 Telephone interview wilh General (retired) Carl E. Vuono, 16 August 
1993. 
17 The current administration supports this idea. As Anthony Lake 
stated in his recent New York Times article, "Our armed forces' primary 
mission is not to conduct peace operations, but to win wars. The bottom -up 
review of our post -cold war defense requirements insures lhat we remain 
prepared to do lhat." 
18 S.L. Arnold and David T . Stahl, "A Power Projection Army m 
Operations Olher Than War," Parameters, Winter 1993-1994, p.8. 
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and they must be enforced. This does not mean they cannot be 
modified. 
During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the mission changed 
from protecting Saudi Arabia to freeing Kuwait, but clear, new 
boundaries were established along with the mission change. This 
offered the military a new set of planning goals. The goals of the 
destruction of the Iraqi Army and freedom of Kuwait dictated the 
conditions for victory in the Gulf War. Of course, military planners 
understand they may not always enjoy such a clear-cut definition of 
combat, and thus must work in a more complex situation such as 
Somalia. A complex situation does not remove the need for distinct 
goals and objectives, including the conditions for victory. 
The terms destruction and freedom, although primafacie opposites, 
actually establish boundaries within which military planners can make 
decisions concerning the use and focus of violence. With this as a 
precedent, what will be the conditions for victory in, say, Bosnia? 
According to French Lieutenant General Phillipe Morillon, former 
deputy commander of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, 
"The use of force without clear political objectives is something we 
must avoid ." 19 The problem with OOTW is that it blurs the 
requirements for and definition of victory. 
Managers of Violence 
According to Samuel Huntington, an officer is a 'manager of 
violence,' 
... the function of a military force is successful armed 
combat. The duties of a military officer include: (1) 
the organizing, equipping, and training of his force, 
(2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction 
of its operation in and out of combat. The direction, 
operation, and control of a human organization whose 
primary function is the application of violence is the 
peculiar skill of the officer .20 
In the words of one officer, "no American commander wants to operate 
under rules that state: 'Close with and destroy the enemy, but don't 
shoot him too much. "' The idea of restraining the use of force 
jeopardizes the mission, his organization, and his soldiers. 
The mission in the Persian Gulf was compatible with the concept 
19For a synopsis of the problems with peacekeeping operation s, see, 
see Sean D. Naylor, "Make Plan, Then Make Peace, " Army Times 14 
February 1994, p. 26. 
20Huntington 11. 
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of the manager of violence. Although fraught with peril, this type of 
mission was accepted by the armed forces because it satisfied certain 
doctrinal principles. It also satisfied certain organizational perceptions. 
What are these perceptions? According to Carl Builder, " ... to find 
the service's dominant concepts of war, one need look no further than 
their finest hours .... of what experience is it most proud?" Builder goes 
on to state that for the Army, " .. .its best memories of itself came in its 
march across Central Europe in the last monLhs of the war [World War 
11]. .. the Army showed itself to be a confident, effective, and robust war 
machine, capable of taking and holding the initiative, demonstrating 
courage, resilience and innovation." 21 
Operation Desert Storm fit the World War II mold. The Persian 
Gulf conflict was a classic example of the Army supporting 
fundamental American principles, using the 'right' amount of force, to 
subdue an oppressor. A ready and well-trained Army coupled with a 
brilliant operational victory generated the new organizational symbol 
for maintaining ability and victory. Operation Desert Storm upheld the 
idea of organizational legitimacy through the idea of using force to 
liberate the Kuwaiti people. Today, the informal goal for warfighters in 
the Pentagon is to achieve another Desert Storm. 
The planners developing the mission in Somalia were still jubilant 
from the laurels they received for their contributions to the Desert 
Storm victory. Somalia might not be the challenge posed by Desert 
Storm, but it still afforded the opportunity to be the liberating Army, 
using force for a good cause. The mission statement at the beginning 
was very simple: 'Provide security for the delivery of relief supplies in 
Somalia. '22 On its face, the mission seemed achievable: enter Somalia, 
suppress the warlords, escort the foodstuffs, and return home. Given all 
this, officers were still hesitant to accept the mission due to the hazy 
definition of victory, and due to uncertainty about the amount of force 
to be used. According to one officer, "Somalia is a tragedy that we can 
make into an opportunity -- if the politicians will help us." 
Officers seek the opportunity to resolve the dilemma of force and 
justice -- 'how can we use force for a good cause?' If a potential conflict 
does not lend itself to resolving this dilemma in any degree, the 
military will remain hesitant. If there is no criteria for victory, the 
civilian leadership presents the officer with two related questions: 1) 
What type of threat am I training my troops to encounter, and 2) What 
can I tell them and the operational planners the purpose of this mission 
is? 
Officers are concerned, and rightly so, that failure to define proper 
21 Carl Builder, The Masks of War, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1989) 131-134. 
22F.M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," Parameters, Vol XXill 
Winter 1993 - 94, p. 27. 
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objectives may result in the improper management of violence -- too 
much or too little. Too much might harm the local population 
needlessly. Too little results in the problems such as the 3 October 
ambush of the forces in Mogadishu in which 18 US Army Rangers 
were killed. As Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnston stated, 
"[W]hat appeared to be a simple mission of getting food to starving 
Somalis turned out to be much more complicated. "23 Failure to 
consider critical aspects of violence and victory, and the resulting 
impact upon support from home leads one to problems similar to the 
ones encountered during Vietnam. 
No more Vietnams 
The 'Vietnam Syndrome' as George Bush called it, is still very 
prevalent within the military community . The spectre of 'another 
Vietnam' raises its ugly head every time the United States becomes 
involved in a conflict, especially those involving civil war or internal 
unrest. To be successful, an operation must have not only force, and 
the will to use that force, but also a clear political objective. 24 One 
civilian official described the dominant view: "Senior military leaders 
don't want another 'dirty little war' where the President gets them into a 
conflict and then leaves them there. "25 
Why is this such a problem? According to Harry Summers, Jr., 
"[the Vietnam Syndrome ... had] far-reaching consequences, for while 
American military power remained formidable after Vietnam, its 
military authority declined precipitously." 26 In fact, the Vietnam 
syndrome poses a serious threat to military legitimacy in a democratic 
system . 
The legitimacy of the military in a democracy lies with the people. 
The military establishment in the United States cannot operate outside 
of the public eye and cannot lose the public trust. 27 As General 
Frederick C. Weyand once explained, 
23Naylor 
24Ibid. 
25 Locher interview . 
26Harry Summers, On Strategy I/ : A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War._ 
(New York: Dell 1992) 7. 
27To insure the Army never went to war without the public trust, DoD 
implemented the Total Force Policy in 1974. This policy, championed by 
then Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams, placed the reserves on the same 
warfighting level as active component forces. For a thorough investigation 
of the ideas behind Total Force, see Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and 
Active Reserve Integration in Wartime," Parameters, Summer 1991 pp. 35 -
50. 
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Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar 
relationship between the American Army and the 
American people. When the American Army is 
committed, the people are committed; when the 
American people lose their commitment it is futile to 
try and keep the Army committed. In the final 
analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm 
of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the 
American people.28 
The concern about public support during operations was validated 
following the 3 October firefight between American Rangers and 
Somali gangs. The deaths of eighteen Americans dictated a fundamental 
change in US policy towards Somalia and the establishment of a 
withdrawal date. One cannot help but draw the conclusion that the 
change in policy was related to a change in feelings by the American 
public about the war. 
Although American officers join the Army to uphold and defend the 
Constitution, they do not want to fall victim to the vacillations of 
elected representatives who may change their policy on a moments' 
notice. Any form of operations other than war includes the aspect of 
political will. This is what worries officers the most. Officer's specific 
questions include: Will there be adequate rules of engagement to protect 
friendly forces and conduct operations? Will the operation be run from 
the tactical headquarters or from the Pentagon? Will the operation have 
Congressional and Executive branch sanction? These questions 
demonstrate the complexity of the political aspects of operations other 
than war , and serve as speedbumps to the rapid acceptance of any 
operation other than warfighting . 
Before any external military operation is conducted, the military 
desires that the government determine the focus and rules of engagement 
for the mission and that the government ensure support for the mission . 
If this support and consensus are not present, the armed force will 
remain skeptical of the operation. 
Paradigm Shift: The Genesis of Doctrinal Change 
Even before the demise of the USSR and the advent of the Iraqi 
crisis, the Army was planning to reduce and reorganize itself . The 
disappearance of the threat in Europe merely hastened this process and 
deepened the force and budget cuts. Despite the USSR's dissolution, 
28Fred C. Weyand and Harry G. Summers , Jr. , 'Vietnam Myths and 
American Realities ," CDRS CALL (Washington D.C. : Department of the 
Army Pamphlet 360-828 (July-August 1976), p. 7, quoted from On Strategy, 
p . 75. 
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the challenge of low intensity conflict and of regional crises remained. 
Much of the debate in the post-Soviet period focuses on confronting and 
prioritizing these remaining threats. 
As early as October 1989, General Colin Powell, then Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had come to the conclusion that the reforms 
initiated by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev would usher in a new 
security era for the United States.29 Consequently, Powell immediately 
set to work defining the new environment that the United States would 
face in the decade of the 1990s. 
Despite Powell's broad vision of the potential for change, much of 
the thrust of the new strategy focused on the mid-intensity dangers of 
future Iraqi-style wars brought on by the proliferation of high-
technology weapons and weapons of mass destruction. 30 There was no 
widespread agreement among the various leaders in the services and the 
legislature. None of the service chiefs immediately agreed with Powell. 
All of them argued for a future similar to the past. 31 The Army's 
initial plan, founded in concepts of total victory, envisioned reducing 
the force only down to 625,000, mostly in response to the anticipated 
results of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. 32 
The result of this tumult in the strategic view of the security 
environment was that low intensity conflict entered the mainstream for 
all of the services. 33 The Navy and Marine Corps even adopted a 
"littoral" strategy, or as some call it, a "brown water" strategy, that 
29 Don M. Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets : DominanJ Influences in 
Executive Decision Making, Post -Cold War, 1989-91 (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993) 8-9. See also 
Harry E. Rothmann, Forging A New National Military Strategy in a Post -
Cold War World: A Perspective from the JoinJ Staff (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992) 7. Both Snider and 
Rothmann were Army colonels working on the production of strategy 
statements in this period. 
30 In the Aspen speech, Bush spoke of "renegade regimes" and of 20 
countries with chemical warfare capabilities, and another 15 that would 
soon possess ballistic missile technologies. See the reprint of the speech 
in Cheney, 1991, 131-134 . 
31 Snider 13. In fact the service chiefs asked for 2% real growth in the 
defense budget for several years. 
32 Vuono was successful in the early meetings with Powell, pegging the 
Army size to a total U.S. force in Europe of 150,000. See Snider 15. See 
also statements by Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone and Chief of 
Staff of the Army General Carl E. Vuono, 29 March 1990 in U.S. Senate, 
Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1991, Hearings before 
the Committee on Appropriations, 101st cong., 2d sess ., pt. 3 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1990) 3, 17-18. 
33Much of the following is adopted from Rick Waddell, 'The Army and 
Peacetime Low Intensity Conflict, 1961-1993: The Process of Peripheral 
and Fundamental Military Change," diss ., Columbia, 1993. 
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foresaw the future in terms of force projection and not maritime 
dominance, which was taken as a given.34 
The Army also reconfigured its thinking. As Army Chief of Staff 
Gordon Sullivan put it, "America needs a different model by which to 
raise, equip, organize, educate, train, fight, coordinate, and sustain her 
armed forces." 35 Sullivan also suggested two ways of viewing the use 
of force: "war," and "operations other than war."36 Sullivan maintained 
that this new view of warfare was necessary to replace the negative aim 
of containment -- stopping the spread of Soviet power -- with a positive 
aim: "to promote democracy, regional stability, and economic 
prosperity." 37 Again this policy reflects attempts to use force for a 
'good' cause. Additionally, this shift allows the Army to get smaller, 
yet more active at home in all manner of civic undertakings from 
disaster relief to the vaccinating of inner city children, thus contributing 
to "the challenges of domestic regeneration." 38 
Thus, the consequence of Sullivan's views, which were different 
from those of his predecessor, was that the Army would be much more 
active at home and abroad, despite reducing its size by at least 33%. In 
1993 the Army had 590,000 soldiers on active duty. Under the new 
policies, about 25,000 were engaged in deployments to more than sixty 
countries on any given day. 39 This was double the amount of 1992, 
and was slated to rise, while the Army's end strength was slated to fall. 
Almost all of these deployments would fall into the categories of low 
intensity conflict. To respond to these changes in the security 
environment and in the national strategy, the Army completed, or 
planned, major changes in doctrine. 
34 See Sean O'Keefe, Admiral Frank Kelso, General C.E. Mundy, From 
the Sea : Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Navy, September 1992). The authors are, 
respectively , Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operation s, and 
Commandant of the Marine Corps. 
35 General Gordon R. Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik, 
Land Warfare in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 1993) 8. 
36 I will continue to use the phrase "low intensity conflict" except when 
referring directly to official Army publications using the new phrase. 
37 Sullivan and Dubik 8. 
38 Sullivan and Dubik 5. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 
Affairs, Deborah Roche Lee , spoke of "utilizing military forces, and 
reserves in particular, to try to add value and give back and meet needs in 
America that are otherwise going unmet." See William Mathews, "New 
Chief Sees Increased Role for Reserves," Army Times, 21 June 1993, 20. 
39 Sullivan 3. Army end strength is slated to reach 545,000 by end of 
Fiscal Year 1995 in September 1994. 
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Doctrine 
In late 1990, the Anny issued a new edition of its low-intensity 
warfare doctrine FM (Field Manual) 100-20, titled Military Operations 
in Low Intensity Conflict. As will be noted below, the new manual 
was almost dead upon arrival; however it did represent a significant 
improvement over both the last edition for 1981 and an interim field 
circular from 1986. 
The 1990 edition retained four broad categories of conflict from the 
mid-1980s: insurgency, terrorism, peacekeeping, and peacetime 
contingency operations. The writers addressed in detail the political 
environment of each of the different categories, emphasizing the often 
highly-charged political nature of low intensity conflict, and the ever-
present ethical, moral, and legal dilemmas. 40 A significant 
modification to the old manual is the inclusion, as an "imperative," of 
the notion of "legitimacy," defined as "the willing acceptance of the 
right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and 
enforce decisions." 41 Success in all low intensity operations, according 
to the manual, depends upon encouraging and sustaining legitimacy. 42 
With this manual, the Army exposed its concept of low intensity 
conflict well beyond the near total focus on counterinsurgency of the 
earlier doctrinal publications. Yet, because the topic of low intensity 
conflict was treated so lightly in the main doctrinal manual in 
existence, the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 Operations. the new FM 100-
20 was not taken seriously. Moreover, the new FM 100-20 was put 
into revision almost upon being issued. 
The Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono, and his doctrinal writers at 
TRADOC, determined that having two doctrines, one for war fighting 
and another for low intensity conflict, no longer made sense. 43 The 
chief doctrinal writer for the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, Colonel James 
McDonough, maintained that all Army operations deserved treatment in 
the new manual. 44 Moreover, McDonough thought that low intensity 
40 See FM 100-20, 1990, pages 1-2 through 1-4, 1-8 and 1-9, and 
Appendix B ''The Law and Low Intensity Conflict." 
41 FM 100-20 1-6. 
42 In reflection of the experience of the 1980s, the manual specifically 
distinguished between supporting insurgency and supporting 
counterinsurgency, while still disproportionately emphasizing the latter . 
The bulk of the second chapter addresses the general political environment 
of insurgency. Three of the six append ice s are devoted to 
counterinsurgency. See FM 100-20, 1990 chapter 2, and Appendices A, D, 
E. U.S. support for insurgency is covered on 2-17 and 2-18. U.S. supporl 
to counterinsurgency is covered on 2-18 through 2-25. 
43 Council Interview. 
44 Interview with Colonel McDonough, West Point, NY, 17 June 1992. 
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conflict should be seen "as part of wider, general theory of war."45 To 
encompass this wider theory, "Doctrine should address nonconventional 
operations in operations short of war, during Limited hostile action and 
in conditions of war and its aftennath." 46 Also, "Future doctrine should 
be expanded to incorporate our evolving missions in areas such as 
stability operations, nation assistance and contraband flow."47 
Controversy also arose over the definition and scope of low 
intensity conflict with President Bush's 2 August 1990 speech at 
Aspen, Colorado. Bush spoke of "peacetime engagement," which 
observers took to mean, variously, a new security strategy for the 
United States, a component of a new strategy, or a new name for low 
intensity conflict. Where the Bush speech seemed to refer to the whole 
breadth of American foreign policy, Secretary of Defense Cheney in his 
1991 annual report called peacetime engagement "a strategy that seeks 
to counteract violence and to promote nation-building. "48 Among the 
crafters of the U.S. statements on national strategy and military 
strategy, "peacetime engagement" was in competition with "active 
presence" and "forward presence" as names for U.S. activities abroad.49 
The resulting interagency confusion, complicated with the 
organizational focus on a definition of victory, made writing the Anny 
doctrine very difficult. 50 Some officers "were troubled to meet 
participants who had 'an aversion to the term "LIC"' and so were ready 
to ignore 'all excellent concepts and useful doctrine [extant low 
intensity conflict] in the process'."51 Reminiscent of the long-standing 
disagreement over war fighting versus low intensity conflict, the Anny 
45 McDonough Interview . Also interview with Major Rick Brennan, 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations and Plans, 
Strategic Plans and Policy Division, May 1992. 
46 James R. McDonough, "Building the New FM 100-5: Process and 
Product," Military Review , October 1991, 12. 
47 McDonough 8. See also General John W. Foss, "Advent of the 
Nonlinear Battlefield : AirLand Battle -Future," Army, February 1991, 22, 
24. Foss was the commander of TRADOC, the organization responsible for 
writing Army doctrine. Foss makes the same point about including low 
intensity conflict in the capstone manual. 
48 Cheney, Annual Report, 1991. 6. See also Thomas W. Crouch , 
Historical Report of the Army-Air Force Center for Low intensity Conflict 
(A-AF CUC) , 1 January 1991-30 June 1991 (Langley Air Force Base, VA: 
CUC Reference Co!Jection) 43-44. Hereafter cited as A-AF CLIC. 
49 See Don M. Snider, Strategy 4 . 
SO Thomas W. Crouch, Historical Report of the Army-Air Force Center 
for Low intensity Conflict (A-AF CUC), 1 July 1991-31 December 1991 
(Lanfley Air Force Base, VA: CUC Reference Collection) 34. 
5 A-AF CUC, 1 July 1991-31 December 1991 34. See Supporting 
Document 83 for the trip report within which these observations were 
recorded. 
160 I The Journal of Political Science 
From Paradigm to Paradigm Shift 
argued for a narrow interpretation of low intensity conflict that 
encompassed only activities not involving combat. 52 Ultimately , the 
Army adopted a new name for low intensity conflict - "operations other 
than war." 
Perhaps as a result of the confusion, the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 
exhibits certain discontinuities. However, the manual does adequately 
address the concepts discussed earlier of victory, violence, and Vietnam. 
As promised by McDonough, the manual propounded a unified vision 
of Army operations which fully incorporated what was known as low 
intensity conflict. The process of rewriting FM 100-5 Operations had 
begun before Desert Shield and Desert Storm.53 In the aftermath of the 
Gulf War, the rewriting began anew to incorporate lessons learned and 
the new military strategy . Consequently, the opening statement is a 
direct reflection of the changed strategy: "(This manual] addresses 
fundamentals of a force-projection army with forward-deployed 
forces." 54 Furthermore, the manual "is the authoritative guide to how 
the Army forces fight wars and conduct operations other than war."55 
Yet, the manual quickly assures the reader that 
Winning wars is the primary purpose of the doctrine 
in this manual .... The manual also addresses the 
related fields of joint and combined operations, 
logistics, the environment of combat, and operations 
other than war. But, its primary focus is war fighting 
and how commanders put all the elements together to 
achieve victory at least cost to American soldiers .56 
With these statements, it becomes clear that low intensity conflict, now 
called operations other than war, had made it into the mainstream of 
Army thinking. 
Unlike joint and combined operations , respectively operations with 
sister U.S. services and with foreign militaries, or logistics, the vast 
majority of operations other than war are not directly linked to war 
fighting. The manual's writers seem uncomfortable with the difference, 
proclaiming in one instance, that "the spirit of the 
52 Lieutenant Colonel Clifton J. Everton and Lieutenant Colonel Arba 
Williamson , "Trip Report," 24 December 1991, 2. This is Supporting 
Document 83 to A-AF CLIC, 1 July 1991-31 December 1991. 
53 Telephone interview with General (retired) John W. Foss, 5 August 
1993 . 
54 FM 100-5 Operation s (Washington , D.C.: Department of the Army, 
June 1993) iv. 
55 FM 100-5, 1993, V . 
56 FM 100-5, 1993, V. 
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offense ... characterizes the American soldier."57 This directly conflicts 
with some of requirements for low intensity missions and reflects the 
'manager of violence' spirit 
The writers wrestled with the notion of how to handle anything 
less than war fighting. In a subsection titled "The Range of Military 
Operations," the manual states, 
The Army classifies its activities during peacetime 
and conflict as operations other than war. During 
peacetime, the US attempts to influence world events 
through those actions that routinely occur between 
nations. Conflict is characterized by hostilities to 
secure strategic objectives. The last environment -
that of war - involves the use of force in combat 
operations against an armed enemy.58 
Clearly there is confusion here between conflict, combat, 
hostilities, and war. This causes concern to many officers, for these 
definitions provide doctrinal guidelines concerning the use of force and 
the conditions for victory. The ambiguities no doubt reflect the lack of 
agreement among the writers and reviewers of the manual. One clue to 
the dividing line between these terms comes from the views of General 
Sullivan, who became Chief of Staff in mid-1991: 
The concept of "war" is usually understood in terms 
of conventional combat: the armies of one nation-
state or alliances of nation-states fighting those of 
another. Every other act of violence, use of force, or 
form of hostility is characterized as "operations other 
than war."59 
However, his distinctions would allow any interstate combat to be 
called war, no matter the level of violence or casualties, thus allowing 
the definitional problem of the "small war" to creep back in. Finally, 
the manual's definitions also lump low intensity conflict missions, 
which all involve at least some chance of combat, into the same 
category as civic missions involving no chance of combat whatsoever . 
While the 1993 edition of Operations continues and even expands 
the conceptual fuzziness of low intensity conflict, it also breaks new 
ground. It brings low intensity missions into the mainstream, giving 
them near-equal billing with war fighting. The manual notes that a 
regional commander-in-chief may be conducting peacetime and conflict 
57 FM 100-5, 1993, 2-0. 
58 FM 100-5, 1993, 2-0. Emphasis original. 
59 Sullivan and Dubik 8. 
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operations in one part of his region simultaneously with a war in 
another part 60 The manual then devotes an entire chapter to the topic 
of operations other than war, heavy with highlighted, inset references to 
"operations other than war" which have been conducted at home and 
abroad since 1990, such as support to civil authorities in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Andrew in Florida, a nation-assistance mission involving 
immunizations in Cameroon, and Operation Provide Comfort in 
Northern Iraq. 
The Army lumped these operations together with those that 
involve the potential of combat, and those that involve small-scale 
com bat. 61 Another officer suggested that the Clinton administration 
officials on the National Security Council were uncomfortable with the 
very notion of "war" and "conflict," preferring to call all operations, 
absent a declaration of war, "peace operations. "62 Hence, one can 
perhaps surmise the reason for the shift away from low intensity 
conflict to "operations other than war." This category has now 
officially grown broader and more diffuse.63 
The manual notes the necessity of including OOTW in the 
capstone doctrine because "Army forces have participated in operations 
other than war in support of national interests throughout its 
history." 64 And, in an even grander sense, "The entire Army .. .is 
involved daily in operations other than war. "65 What does the manual 
say of the conduct of these operations? Continuing the progress begun 
in the 1990 edition of FM 100-20, the chapter highlights the 
importance of legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance: "In operations 
other than war, victory comes more subtly than in war. Disciplined 
forces, measured responses, and patience are essential to successful 
outcomes." 66 In further contrast with the FM 100-5 manuals of the 
1970s and 1980s, with their concentration on speedy victory by massed 
maneuvering of armored units, in operations other than war "the 
activities of relatively small units can have operational, and even 
strategic impact."67 
60 FM 100-5, 1993, 2-0. 
61 For the differences in these two categories of conflict, refer to chapter 
2 above. 
62 Remarks not made for attribution . 
63 In March 1993, the Center for Low Intensity Conflict was preparing a 
draft manual on "Military Support to Civil Authorities ." The manual's 
topics included use of military forces in riot situations, natural disasters, 
combating the importation of illicit narcotics, re -building the national 
infrastructure, and using military personnel to provide medical care and 
education services to American inner cities. McGrew interview. 
64 FM 100-5, 1993, 13-0. 
65 FM 100-5, 1993, 13-2. 
66 FM 100-5, 1993, 13-1. 
67 FM 100-5, 1993, 13-2. 
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The concern for perseverance and restraint in the ·chapter on 
operations other than war seems odd in comparison to the manual's 
remaining focus on speed, maneuver, and firepower. In a manual that 
proclaims that the American soldier is imbued with an offensive spirit, 
notions such as patience, subtlety, and measured response are an odd fit. 
The aggressiveness and lack of hesitation inherent in an offensive spirit 
clearly conflict with the reticence and judiciousness inherent in the idea 
that "the use of overwhelming force may complicate the process toward 
the Army's stated objectives." Certainly the training required of the 
soldier faced with an operation other than war would be more similar to 
that of a police officer than of a combat soldier. Yet, the manual, 
reflecting the "Any good soldier ... " mindset, simply states, "In 
preparing to fight the nation's wars, the Army develops the leadership, 
organizations, equipment, discipline, and skills for a variety of 
operations other than war."68 
This edition of FM 100-5 breaks new ground in its treatment of 
low intensity missions. The nagging discontinuities in its treatment of 
the primary purpose of the Army - war - and its treatment of the 
activities in which the Army engages daily are no doubt a reflection of 
the debate mentioned above over the scope and definition of low 
intensity conflict. That the topic has been brought into the capstone 
manual is also a direct reflection of the perceived changes in the security 
environment and the missions that the Army was required to perform as 
the manual was being written. 
With the new capstone doctrine in place, the Army began work on 
FM 100-23 Peace Operations, which was to be the replacement for the 
1990 edition of FM 100-20. In keeping with the categories of 
activities set forth in FM 100-5, this new manual will address aJI 
activities not included in "war," and will significantly expand the 
treatment of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in light of operations 
in Somalia and Macedonia.69 
68 FM I 00-5, 1993, 13-0. When soldiers are used merely for their 
technical capabilities, absent any potential for combat, such as 
vaccinations or filling potholes, it is undoubtedly true that their technical 
training and their existing organizational structures suffice . However, 
introduce the potential for combat and the question rapidly arises, "how are 
the soldiers trained to respond?" Training soldiers to respond to airborne or 
armored assaults is different than training them to respond to snipers, 
ambushes, or assaults by irregulars. 
69 Interview with Major Rick Brennan, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Democracy, Human Rights, and Peacekeeping, 14 July 1993. 
Brennan had moved on 12 July from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
of the Army for Operations and Plans, Strategic Plans and Policy Division 
where he was responsible for Army policy on peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. 
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Conclusion 
In the 1990s, a vision of warfare based on the Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm experience, as the armor traditionalists would have liked 
it, proved to be too politically unpopular with the civilian reformers in 
Congress and the executive branch, especially in the Clinton 
administration, which did not perceive such scenarios as credible. In 
such an administration, given a desire to promote democratic 
institutions abroad, the desire to use the Army for nation assistance, 
humanitarian relief, and low level military-to-military contacts came to 
be the major policy thrust.70 
By the end of 1991, under pressure from civilians, power shifted to 
officers who might work to overcome organizational constraints. These 
officers might be termed the visionaries. Had the Army remained 
dominated by traditionalists, it would have found itself hard pressed to 
respond well to the missions it was given in an era of budgetary 
constraints. To meet the new missions, and avoid a disgraceful failure, 
the Army no longer has the luxury of dealing with such missions on 
the margin. It has to confront them directly. 
Evidence is not yet available, but a reasonable assumption is that 
one of the reasons for the selection of General Sullivan as General 
Vuono's replacement was Sullivan's willingness to embrace non-
traditional missions. Moreover, the Clinton administration's choice for 
Powell's replacement was General John Shalikashvili, an officer with a 
background as an adviser in Vietnam, and who commanded the large 
humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq. The Clinton 
administration's determination to use the military in non-traditional 
ways made officers who could think intellectually about the subject of 
low intensity conflict all the more important. Yet, these officers were 
not in any sense "mavericks." 
The debate within the Army, though, is not yet over. The Army 
may be at a threshold of change where it must seriously reconsider its 
focus and core. The Army must understand its organizational 
boundaries and seek to modify them towards OOTW. Thus, one needs 
to understand the process of change, and its likely outcomes. Absent 
clear priorities, a consistent effort from civilian leaders, or Army 
involvement in missions such as those in Somalia and the Balkans, 
intergroup conflict based upon organizational discomfort with OOTW 
could continue in a smaller Army, perhaps at a dysfunctional level. 
Fundamental change will become concrete when the Army devises 
lists of tasks for each of the various missions within the concept of 
OOTW, requires units to train on those tasks at all levels from 
individual to higher level "war games," and when the officer corps 
70 The Bush administration had already emphasized these as "Forward 
Presence Operations ." 
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becomes comfortable with the concept of OOTW. By 1993 the Army 
had begun to move in these directions, but was not yet there. Hence, 
we have only change in progress with an as yet undefined outcome. 
Finally, officers in the armed forces must accept Samuel 
Huntington's adage: 
The purpose of military forces is combat, 
that is to deter and to defeat the enemies of the United 
States; that is their central mission, their raison 
d'etre, the only justification for expending resources 
on their creation and maintenance. The forces created 
for that mission, however, can and throughout our 
history have been employed in non-combat non-
military uses. 
The task now facing officers is how to form an organizational 
mentality that incorporates the idea of victory, the management of 
violence, and the support of the American people into a comprehensive 
definition of Operations Other than War. 
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